by Bobbi Gentry (Bridgewater College), Christopher Lawrence (Middle Georgia State University) and Erin Richards (Cascadia Community College)

An increasing number of students are beginning their college careers at community colleges before pursuing bachelor’s degrees at four-year institutions. As enrollments swell at these institutions, issues surrounding transfer and articulation agreements are increasingly important and two-year and four-year institutions need to work together on the recruitment, retention, and transition of political science majors. Central to this collaboration is an understanding of the curriculum. Building on conclusions from the 2011 APSA Teaching and Learning Conference’s Core Curriculum and General Education track regarding a common curriculum in the discipline, we examine the political science curriculum at community colleges using data from 47 two-year colleges with separate political science departments. We examine similarities and differences between these programs, and find sufficient commonality in curriculum to allow students to transfer credits to four-year institutions. We also offer community colleges an indication of common curricular features, and inform the wider profession about community college curriculum design.

Read more here.

PS: Political Science & Politics / Volume 49 / Issue 03 / July 2016, pp 535-540 / Copyright © American Political Science Association 2016

By Carl Klarner (academic and political consultant at klarnerpolitics.com)

I discuss my perceptions about being a professor as they relate to my decision to “leave academia” after attaining tenure, with graduate students or others who are thinking about becoming professors in mind.  I argue that university administrators are driven by perverse incentives that make promoting the public good at a large state university difficult. Lack of institutional support for academic standards is a large part of this.  By presenting a log of my work activities, I caution prospective professors to carefully consider how they might really be spending their time.  From the same log, I compute that my hourly pay was $20.74, consistent with the low hourly wage of many professors.  I then discuss my current job as a consultant and independent scholar, which primarily involves providing data to other political scientists.  Although my current career choice is probably not one that would work for many, I provide my business plan for the insight it might give others wishing to be consultants.

Read more here.

PS: Political Science & Politics / Volume 49 / Issue 03 / July 2016, pp 501-503 / Copyright © American Political Science Association 2016

by Michael H. Crespin (University of Oklahoma) and Anthony J. Madonna (University of Georgia)

Over the last several decades, power and control over public policy has moved away from the legislative branch towards the executive and judicial branches. Critics lament the perceived increased use of unilateral presidential tools, claiming an out of control imperial presidency. Others worry that judges insulated from electoral pressure are effectively making policy with high profile rulings in cases such as Shelby Counter v. Holder and Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.

In this issue of PS: Political Science & Politics, we asked several members of Congress to join us in reflecting on these changes in long-form essays. The essays—written by Representatives David Price (D-NC) and Dina Titus (D-NV), former-Representative John Barrow (D-GA) and Senator Mike Lee (R-UT)—highlight both some clear consensuses and notable disagreements. All the essays agreed that Congress is weakening and that this has negative normative implications for American democracy. They also agreed that both ideological changes external to Congress and internal congressional rules and processes—specifically the centralization at the hands of chamber leaders—were to blame. However, the authors debated whether ideological shifts were asymmetric and the extent to which congressional dysfunction was internal as opposed to being influenced by electoral factors.

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PS: Political Science & Politics / Volume 49 / Issue 03 / July 2016, pp 473-477 / Copyright © American Political Science Association 2016

By Alexander Hertel-Fernandez (Harvard University)

State governments have surged to the forefront of national politics in recent years. Faced with partisan gridlock and concerns about the size of the federal deficit, national political leaders have increasingly looked to the states as alternative sites for policy making. Yet, despite the ongoing importance of state politics, liberals and conservatives possess vastly different resources to bring to America’s statehouses. As a result of four decades of aggressive institution building, conservatives can count on a well-developed infrastructure of organizations to promote a coordinated national-policy agenda. Liberals, however, have faltered in similar efforts, establishing only a minimal and fragmented capacity for subnational-policy mobilization. Why is it the case that the Right has enjoyed a strong and increasing capacity for action across the states in recent decades whereas the Left has not? Although there are numerous explanations for this imbalance, one factor—the role of funders—can provide a substantial amount of analytical leverage in explaining the failure of left-wing state networks. This paper describes how the behavior of philanthropic donors can explain the lack of a robust liberal policy infrastructure in the states, and also offers broader insights into the relationship between donors, grantees, political leaders, and—ultimately—policy outcomes.

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PS: Political Science & Politics / Volume 49 / Issue 03 / July 2016, pp 461-465 / Copyright © American Political Science Association 2016

By Rob Reich (Stanford University)

Foundations represent the institutional codification and promotion of plutocratic voices in democratic societies. With low accountability, donor-directed preferences in perpetuity, and generous tax subsidies, they are institutional oddities. What, if anything, confers democratic legitimacy on foundations? I first show why foundations might be a repugnant threat to democratic governance and then defend a particular mode of operation that offers redemption. I argue that foundations can play an important discovery role in democracy, a mechanism for experimentation in social policy over a long time horizon.

Read more here.

PS: Political Science & Politics / Volume 49 / Issue 03 / July 2016, pp 466-472 / Copyright © American Political Science Association 2016